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Summary 
The financial crisis of 2007-2008 affected the financial sector worldwide. After the crisis, 
regulatory bodies and governments implemented stricter capital requirements for banks and 
financial institutions in order to cushion the impact of similar shocks in the future. In Norway 
the government aims to impose even stricter regulations than the Basel III-accord require. In 
opposition to the new rules DNB, Norway’s largest bank, claims the new rules will increase 
their capital cost and therefore increased their mortgage lending rates by 0,3 percentage 
points. 
This paper aims at assessing the quantitative impact of higher primary capital in the capital 
structure of DNB Bank ASA. We intend to determine whether higher equity will lead to a 
higher cost of capital, which in turn will imply a higher interest rate on loans extended to 
customers. We will estimate DNBs capital structure under future Basel III standards and 
Norwegian legislation. We also estimate the effect of proposed Norwegian rules for stricter 
risk weighting of mortgages in DNBs assets. We apply the Capital Asset Pricing Model to 
calculate the regulations impact on the cost of capital for DNB Bank ASA under various 
scenarios. 
We find that stricter capital requirements lead an increased cost of capital for DNB Bank 
ASA. Their cost of capital increases from 1.26 % under Basel III to 1.38 % if we introduce 
the new Norwegian RWA-rules and capital requirements. The effect of rising cost of capital 
for DNB Bank ASA is justified to lead to increased lending rates costs for consumers, but 
does not justify the magnitude of DNBs rate increase of 0.3 percentage points in March 2013. 
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1. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the effect on cost of capital of Norway’s largest bank, 
DNB Bank ASA, due to higher capital requirements recommended by the Basel III standards 
(Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, 2010) proposed by the Basel Committee of 
Banking Supervision (BCBS) and Norway’s Ministry of Finance. The intention behind 
quantifying the effect on cost of capital is to provide insight into the real impact of higher 
capital requirements on lending rates once banks adhere to these standards. 
Prior to the financial crisis of 2007-2008, many large sized-banks were highly leveraged
1
. 
Much of their financing came from short-term debt, high-risk funds such and exotic new 
financial instruments, including mortgage
2
-backed securities
3
, and other risky debt. The 
misallocation of investments (in particular towards real estate) and flawed internal controls in 
the financial sector (particularly in the United States), manifested itself in the form of global 
financial crisis.  (Diamond & Rajan, 2009) The financial crisis revealed the negative 
externalities that are associated with highly leveraged banks, exposed by a decrease in asset 
values. These negative externalities included increased probability of bank failures, a 
significantly less-than robust financial system and impending taxpayer bailouts
4
. (Admati, et 
al., 2011) Even though these negative externalities are associated with high leverage, banks 
favour debt funding because of the unique nature of competition in the financial services 
industry. The nature of competition is such that banks tend to adopt leveraged funding in 
order to enjoy the competitive advantage of cheap funding. (Kashyap, et al., 2010) 
This paper uses the Modigliani-Miller theorem and Capital Asset Pricing Model as building 
blocks. Modigliani-Miller showed that operating decisions of a firm are not affected by its 
capital structure
5
 and thus, a bank’s lending rate should not be affected by its capital structure 
(Modigliani & Miller, 1958). However, the ideal assumptions postulated by Modigliani-
Miller are often not applicable, especially for financial institutions. Proponents argue that the 
model still can be applied to banks by adjusting for the deviations from ideal assumptions. It 
                                                 
1
 A firm with significantly more debt (loan funds) than equity (own funds) is considered to be highly leveraged. 
2
 An agreement to give up ownership of an asset (usually, a home) if one is unable to repay a loan (usually, a 
home loan) 
3
 It is a security that has a group of mortgages as an underlying.  
4
 Situations wherein governments offers money to a business to avoid negative consequences of the business’s 
downfall. 
5
 The composition of the sources of a firm’s asset-base through a mix of debt and equity. 
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has been shown by Kashyap, et al. (2010) through their empirical analysis that Modigliani-
Miller theorem does indeed applies to banks in this manner. Additionally, the quantitative 
models used by banks for risk management have the same underlying assumptions as the 
Modigliani-Miller theorem, indicating its practicality. (Admati, et al., 2011) 
Banks themselves tend to favour as much debt as possible, given the apparent lower cost of 
debt compared to equity. The lower cost of debt is, among other things, caused by the 
favourable treatment of debt in our tax system. Interest
6
 paid to debt holders is a deductible 
expense for taxation purposes, while dividends
7
 to equity holders are not. While bank owners 
benefit from leverage in the form of lower taxes, as a whole, the public loses owing to the 
negative externalities of higher leverage. Thus, the social cost of banks’ debt is higher than 
their private cost. This should be considered when deciding the optimal capital structure, but 
will not be evaluated in this paper. (Admati, et al., 2011) 
Equity is considered to be costlier than debt. This is not only because of tax effects but also 
because of the perception that equity is more risky, as well as agency conflicts and other 
reasons. Markets usually perceive equity issuance as a negative signal, which forces 
companies to issue equity at a lower price than their current stock price. There is an 
information asymmetry between the better-informed management and the less-informed 
investors. Outsiders may perceive equity issuance as a signal implying that management 
believes the stock is overvalued. As a result, issuance of stock is often accompanied by a fall 
in the stock price.  
Management anticipates this negative signal and is therefore apprehensive towards issuance 
of fresh equity. DNBs CFO has publically made this argument in the Norwegian debate. 
(Næss, 2013). Management prefers to build equity reserves through retained earnings, as 
DNB has done in past years. Thus, a “pecking order” of capital structure is formed. Firms 
that are inclined to have their capital structures more equity-heavy tend to build retained 
earnings. If they do not have sufficient levels of retained earnings, they tend to raise funds 
through debt instead of raising equity (Kashyap, et al., 2010). However, if the banks do not 
have discretion in issuance of equity, the associated negative signal can be reduced or 
removed. If regulatory authorities or governments dictate all banks to raise equity levels, the 
negative stigma associated with equity issuance can be curbed entirely. (Admati, et al., 2011) 
                                                 
6
 Periodic payments made by a borrower to a lender as a consideration of funds 
7
 Periodic payments made by a company from its earned profits to its shareholders  
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To counter the negative externalities from elevated leverage, financial regulators and 
supervisors intend to set capital requirement standards to avoid future large-scale shocks seen 
in the crisis of 2007-2008. This paper focuses on the Basel III standards and Norwegian 
legislation for capital requirements, seen from the banks’ perspective.  
1.1 The Norwegian debate 
At the beginning of 2013, DNB announced it was increasing its mortgage interest rate in 
response to the new capital requirements announced by the Norwegian authorities. In the 
wake of this interest rate increase, other banks soon followed. A debate erupted between 
DNB on one side and the Government, Statistics Norway and certain academics on the other. 
The debate concerned whether or not the increased capital demands would increase DNBs 
capital costs, and therefore justify DNB increasing their interest rate 0,3 percentage points 
(Lynum, 2013). 
The national statistical bureau, Statistics Norway, and Professor Bernt Arne Ødegaard from 
the University of Bergen, both referenced the Modigliani-Miller theorem. They argued that 
the main tenents of M&M applied for DNB, and that DNB was unlikely to accrue added costs 
due to the increased capital requirements  (Hungnes, 2013). 
DNBs Chief Financial Officer responded by describing several ways in which DNBs scenario 
might deviate from M&M: depositor insurance making debt cheaper, due to lowered risk for 
lenders, and the Norwegian tax code favouring debt over equity. He claimed that deposit 
insurance and the Norwegian Government’s implicit guarantee of Norwegian banks causes 
creditors to disregard financial institutions’ leverage ratio. Since debt is not strongly affected 
by leverage, it is cheaper for banks to finance themselves with debt than M&M suggests 
(Næss, 2013). 
The government issued a statement saying that the banks were at fault, and that they should 
accept lower dividends instead of increasing interest rates for consumers. DNB responded by 
lowering their divided from 50 percent of profits to 25 percent of profits. Certain finance 
professors claimed that this was irrelevant, since shareholders would reap profits of retained 
earnings through increased share price (Ødegaard, 2013). 
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DNBs decision to increase interest rates to consumers and reduce dividends made analysts 
believe that DNB would be able to raise the required equity cheaply. (Editorial, 2013) 
In this paper, I will analyze the implications of DNB changing its capital structure to see 
whether the increase in mortgage interest rates for consumers of 3 percentage points was 
justified.  
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2. Basel III Standards 
2.1 Introduction 
At its meeting held on September 12, 2010, the Group of Governors and Heads of 
Supervision, the oversight body of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), 
announced new norms for capital requirement for banks (Bank for International Settlements, 
2010).  
As these norms are the third edition of standards issued by BCBS, they are called “Basel III 
standards”. The Basel I standards of 1988 aimed to build a general minimum base of own 
funds in every bank, the Basel II standards of 2004 prescribed more capital to manage higher 
risk. The objective of Basel III standards is to enable the banking sector to absorb shocks 
arising from financial and economic stress, thereby mitigating spillover risk on the real 
economy from the financial sector (Ministry of Finance, Norway, 2012). 
2.2 Definition of Capital 
Basel III has redefined capital as comprising of following elements:  
 Tier 1 capital (Going concern capital) 
 Common Equity Tier 1 Capital (CET 1 capital): consists of capital instruments that 
meet the conditions laid down in Article 26 of EU Regulation. Includes share 
premium
8
 accounts related to capital instruments, retained earnings, accumulated 
other income, other real reserves and funds. 
 Additional Tier 1 Capital: consists of instruments that meet the conditions laid down 
in Article 49 of EU Regulation. Includes the share premium accounts related to these 
instruments, which are more lenient than article 26. 
 Tier 2 capital (Going concern capital): consists of capital instruments that meet the 
conditions laid down in Article 60 of EU Regulation and the share premium accounts 
related to these capital instruments. This is relevant for institutions calculating Risk 
Weighted Exposure amounts in accordance with the “Standardized Approach”. 
                                                 
8
 The amount paid by the shareholder above the cost of the share 
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Includes general credit risk adjustments, gross-of-tax effects of up to 1.25% of risk-
weighted exposure. Also relevant for institutions calculating Risk Weighted Exposure 
amounts under the Internal Ratings Based approach (IRB), resulting from the 
calculation laid down in Article 154 and 155. May amount up to 0.6% of risk-
weighted exposure calculated under the IRB approach. 
The standards are broadly divided as: Capital Requirement Standards, Leverage Ratio 
standards and Liquidity Requirements. 
2.3 Capital Requirement Standards 
The following capital requirement standards were proposed as per Basel III standards: 
 Common Equity Tier 1 capital will be raised from the existing 2% requirement to 
4.5% (as a percentage of risk weighted assets
9
 (RWA)) 
 The Tier 1 capital requirement will be raised from the existing 4% requirement to 6% 
(thus, CET 1 capital shall be 4.5% and additional tier 1 capital shall be 1.5%).  
 The total capital (total of Tier1 and Tier 2 capital) ratio is required to be 8%.  
It was recommended that these minimum capital requirements be fulfilled by January 1, 
2015.  
The standards also introduced two new capital buffer requirements which were earlier absent 
in the Basel II standards. The buffer requirements are scheduled to be gradually fulfilled from 
2016 to 2019. The buffer requirements are: 
 Capital conservation buffer: It is intended to ensure that institutions are able to absorb 
losses in stress periods lasting for a number of years. It shall be maintained at 2.5% of 
RWA and is to be met by CET 1 capital. It has to be maintained at all times. Thus, 
including 4.5% of CET 1 capital and 2.5% of capital conservation buffer, the 
institutions must hold 7% CET 1 capital.  
 Countercyclical buffer:  is introduced to achieve the goal of protecting the banking 
sector and the real economy from risks stemming from the boom-bust cycles in 
aggregate credit growth. It shall be maintained from 0% to 2.5% of RWA and has to 
                                                 
9
 The value of assets (loans advanced) of the bank  as weighed by risk associated with them. 
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be met by CET 1 capital. The buffer is required during periods of excessive credit 
growth and it is released in an economic downturn. (Accenture Risk Management, 
2012) 
As expressed above, based on minimum CET 1 capital of 4.5% and capital conservation 
buffer of 2.5%, the combined CET 1 capital must be 7%. It is proposed that the individual 
banks must adhere to minimum capital conservation ratios at different levels of CET 1 capital 
(Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, 2010). A 100% capital conservation ratio implies 
no distribution of dividend, whereas a 0% capital conservation ratio implies no restriction on 
distribution of dividends (PwC, 2011). 
Table 1 outlines the minimum capital conservation ratios at different levels of CET 1 capital: 
Table 1: Minimum Capital Conservation Ratios at different levels of CET 1 Capital 
Common Equity Tier 1 Ratio Minimum Capital Conservation Ratios 
(expressed as a percentage of earnings) 
4.5% - 5.125% 100% 
>5.125% - 5.75% 80% 
>5.75% - 6.375% 60% 
>6.375% - 7.0% 40% 
> 7.0% 0% 
(Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011) 
Figure 1 gives a comparison of Basel II/Basel 2.5 with Basel III capital requirements.  
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Figure 1: Capital Requirements Basel II/Basel 2.5 vs. Basel III
Tier 1 Capital Additional Tier 1 Capital
Tier 2 Capital Tier 3 Capital
Capital Conservation Buffer Counter-cyclical Buffer
Source: Accenture Risk Management, 2010
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Figure 2 details the phase-in arrangements for the Basel III capital requirements: 
 
Among the major standards proposed under the Basel III standards, the cost of capital of 
banks will be affected by capital requirement standards. These standards stipulate a minimum 
capital (majorly through maintenance of Tier 1 capital) as a percentage of risk-weighted 
assets that a bank must maintain. As banks have to infuse higher equity in their capital 
structure to meet the capital requirements, these capital requirement standards is expected to 
increase the cost of capital of the banks depending on their existing capital structure.  
2.4 Leverage Ratio 
Leverage Ratio is a new regulatory tool introduced by Basel III standards. Initially, it is not 
intended to be a binding instrument but as an additional feature that can be applied on 
individual banks at the discretion of supervisory authorities. It aims to “migrate” to a binding 
('Pillar one') measure in 2018, after appropriate review and calibration.  
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Figure 2: Phase-in arrangements for Basel III Capital Requirements
CET 1 Capital Additional Tier 1 Capital Tier 2 Capital Capital Conservation Buffer Countercyclical Buffer
Source: Accenture Risk Management, 2012
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Leverage Ratio has been defined as the ratio of Tier 1 Capital to Total Exposure expressed as 
a percentage.  
Here, total exposure follows the accounting measure of exposure and includes on-balance 
sheet items (including repurchase agreements
10
, securities and derivatives
11
) and off-balance 
sheet items (including commitments, unconditionally cancellable commitments, direct credit 
substitutes, acceptances, standby letters of credit
12
, failed transactions and unsettled 
securities). 
The basis of calculation is the average of the monthly leverage ratio over the quarter. BCBS 
will test a minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio of 3% during the parallel run period from January 
1, 2013 to January 1, 2017 (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011).  
By October 31, 2016, the European Banking Authority (EBA) will report to the European 
Commission among others on whether 3% would be an appropriate level for a Tier 1 capital-
based leverage ratio and whether the leverage ratio should be the same for all institutions or 
differ for various types of institutions. Based on the EBA report, final adjustments of the ratio 
would be made in the first half of 2017 (Accenture Risk Management, 2012). 
 
The transitional arrangement for Leverage Ratio is as follows:  
 January 1, 2011: Start supervisory monitoring period (development of templates)  
 January 1, 2013 – Jan. 1, 2017: Parallel run (leverage ratio and its components will be 
tracked, including its behavior relative to the risk based requirement)  
 January 1, 2015: Disclosure of the leverage ratio by banks  
 First half of 2017: Final adjustments  
 January 1, 2018: Migration to binding (Pillar 1) treatment 
                                                 
10
 Short-term borrowings which a dealer sells to an investor and subsequently buys back. 
11
 An instrument whose price is dependent on an underlying asset. 
12
 A guarantee by a bank on behalf of a buyer that a payment shall be made to the seller. In case the buyer 
defaults on his payment, the bank pays to the seller on behalf of the buyer. 
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2.5 Global Liquidity Standard 
During the early “liquidity13 phase” of the financial crises, many banks – despite adequate 
capital levels –experienced difficulties because they did not manage their liquidity in a 
prudent manner. The financial crisis underlined the importance of liquidity to the proper 
functioning of financial markets and the banking sector. In order to address short-term and 
long-term resilience, BCBS has formulated two new global liquidity standards. 
2.5.1 Liquidity Coverage Ratio 
The first objective is to promote short-term resilience of a bank’s liquidity risk profile by 
ensuring that it has sufficient high quality liquid resources to survive an acute stress scenario 
lasting for one month. BCBS developed the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) to achieve this 
objective (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011).  
To meet the requirement, institutions shall “at all times hold liquid assets, the sum of the 
values of which equals, or is greater than, the liquidity outflows less the liquidity inflows 
under stressed conditions so as to ensure that institutions maintain levels of liquidity buffers 
which are adequate to face any possible imbalance between liquidity inflows and outflows 
under stressed conditions over a short period of time. Institutions shall not count double 
liquidity inflows and liquid assets.” (Accenture Risk Management, 2012) 
Thus, LCR = 
                         
                                               
  ≥ 100% 
High Quality Liquid Assets include: 
 Level 1 assets include cash, transferable assets of extremely high liquidity and credit 
quality (minimum 60% of liquid assets) 
 Level 2 assets include transferable assets that are of high liquidity and credit quality and 
maximum 40% of liquid assets 
Total Net Liquidity Outflows over a 30-day period implies: 
 Liquidity Outflows including retail deposits, other liabilities, collateral other than Level 
1 assets, credit and liquid facilities minus 
                                                 
13
 The ease of converting an asset into cash. Higher the ease, more liquid is the asset. 
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 Liquidity Inflows including cash due from non-financial customers, secured lending and 
capital market driven transactions, undrawn credit and liquidity facilities, specified 
payables and receivables expected over the 30 day horizon, liquid assets and new 
issuance of obligations 
The LCR will be introduced by 2015 after an observation period to avoid possible unintended 
consequences. From 2013, there is a general requirement for banks to keep appropriate 
liquidity coverage. The reporting frequency for the LCR should not be less than monthly. 
2.5.2 Net Stable Funding Ratio 
The second objective is to promote resilience over a longer time horizon by creating 
additional incentives for a bank to fund its activities with more stable sources of funding on 
an ongoing structural basis. The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) has a time horizon of one 
year and has been developed to provide a sustainable maturity structure of assets and 
liabilities. The NSFR standard stipulates that the available amount of stable funding must be 
greater than required amount of stable funding. (Basel Committee of Banking Supervision, 
2010) 
NSFR = 
                        
                       
   > 100% 
The minimum requirement specified above is to be introduced by January 1, 2018. There is 
an observation period until then. The NSFR should be reported at least quarterly. The 
components of NSFR are as follows:  
 Available Stable Funding (ASF): The available amount of stable funding is calculated by 
first assigning the carrying value of an institution’s equity and liabilities to one of five 
categories as presented in Table 2 below. The amount assigned to each category is to be 
multiplied by an ASF factor and the total ASF is the sum of the weighted amounts. 
Table 2: Components of Available Stable Funding and Associated ASF Factors 
ASF Factor Components of ASF 
100%  Tier 1 & Tier 2 capital  
 Preferred stock not included in Tier 2 capital with maturity ≥ 1 year 
 Secured and unsecured borrowings and liabilities with effective remaining 
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maturities ≥ 1 year 
90%  Stable non-maturity (demand) deposits and term deposits with residual maturity 
< 1 year 
80%  Less stable non-maturity (demand) deposits and term deposits with residual 
maturity < 1 year 
50%  Unsecured wholesale funding, non-maturity deposits and term deposits with 
residual maturity < 1 year provided by non-financial corporates, sovereigns, 
central banks, multilateral development banks and Public Sector Enterprises 
0%  All other equities and liabilities not included in above categories 
(Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011) 
 Required Stable Funding (ASF): The required amount of stable funding is calculated 
as the sum of the value of the assets held and funded by the institution, multiplied by a 
specific Required Stable Funding (RSF) factor assigned to each particular asset type. 
Table 3 outlines the components of RSF and RSF factor to be multiplied to each component: 
Table 3: Components of Required Stable Funding and Associated RSF Factors 
RSF Factor Components of RSF 
0%  Cash 
 Unencumbered short-term unsecured instruments and transactions with 
outstanding maturities < 1 year  
 Unencumbered securities with stated remaining maturities < 1 year with no 
embedded options  
 Unencumbered securities held where the institution has an offsetting reverse 
repurchase transaction  
 Unencumbered loans to financial entities with effective remaining maturities < 1 
year that are not renewable and for which the lender has an irrevocable right to 
call 
5%  Unencumbered marketable securities with residual maturities of one year or 
greater representing claims on or claims guaranteed by sovereigns, central 
banks, BIS, IMF, EC, non-central government PSEs or multilateral development 
banks that are assigned a 0% risk-weight under the Basel II standardized 
approach, provided that active repo or sale-markets exist for these securities 
20%  Unencumbered corporate bonds or covered bonds rated AA- or higher with 
residual maturities ≥ 1 year satisfying all of the conditions for Level 2 assets in 
the LCR  
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 Unencumbered marketable securities with residual maturities ≥ 1 year 
representing claims on or claims guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks, non-
central government PSEs that are assigned a 20% risk-weight under the Basel II 
standardized approach, provided that they meet all of the conditions for Level 2 
assets in the LCR 
50%  Gold  
 Unencumbered equity securities, not issued by financial institutions or their 
affiliates, listed on a recognized exchange and included in a large cap market 
index  
 Unencumbered corporate bonds and covered bonds that are central bank eligible 
and are not issued by financial institutions 
65%  Unencumbered residential mortgages of any maturity that would qualify for the 
35% or lower risk-weight under Basel II Standardized Approach  
 Other unencumbered loans, excluding loans to financial institutions, with a 
remaining maturity of one year or greater, that would qualify for the 35% or 
lower risk-weight under Basel II Standardized Approach for credit risk 
85%  Unencumbered loans to retail customers and SME (as defined in the LCR) 
having a remaining maturity < 1 year 
100%  All other assets not included in the above categories 
(Source: Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2011) 
2.6 Comparison of Capital Adequacy among Banks 
operating in Norway 
Table 4 shows the capital adequacy ratios in three banks – DNB, Nordea and Danske that 
operate in Norway 
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DNB Bank has not published its LCR, but it has been announced as 130 % in Nordea Bank 
and 126 % in Danske Bank for the first quarter of 2013. 
Table 4: Capital Adequacy Ratios in Banks operating in Norway
DNB Bank Nordea Bank Danske Bank
(Million NOK) (Million EUR) (Million DKK)
31-Mar-13 31-Mar-13 31-Mar-13
A. Common Equity Tier 1 Capital 99,976             17,215               120,397          
B. Tier 1 Capital 103,065           19,243               156,439          
C. Tier 2 Capital 13,679             4,712                 16,070            
D. Total Eligible Primary Capital (B+C) 116,744           23,955               172,509          
E. Risk Weighted Assets 891,346           97,186               797,170          
Capital Adequacy Ratios
Common Equity Tier 1 Capital Ratio (A/E) 11.4% 17.7% 15.1%
Tier 1 Capital Ratio (B/E) 11.7% 19.8% 19.6%
Capital Ratio (D/E) 13.2% 24.6% 21.6%
(Source: Respective Bank 2013 Quarter 1 Interim Results)
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3. Norwegian Legislation Capital Requirements 
On March 22, 2013, the Ministry of Finance of Norway, put forward a legislative proposal on 
new capital requirements for credit institutions and investment firms. Norwegian authorities 
have supported the international efforts to strengthen credit institutions' capital base in 
general. It is proposed that the new rules will come into force on July 1, 2013, and that the 
requirements are gradually increased. The proposal includes a new minimum requirement on 
Common Equity Tier 1 capital (CET 1 capital), and four new buffer capital requirements, for 
credit institutions and parent companies of banking groups. The new requirements are as 
follows:  
 CET 1 capital ratio of 4.5% 
 Capital conservation buffer requirement of 2.5% to be met by CET 1 capital 
 Systemic risk14 buffer requirement increased from the existing 2% to 3% from July 1, 
2014 to be met by CET 1 capital. Thus, Total CET 1 Capital Ratio (including basic CET 
1 capital ratio, capital conservation buffer and systemic risk buffer) has been increased 
from 9% to 10% 
 Total capital ratio of 8.0% thereby implying an additional Tier 1 capital or Tier 2 capital 
of 3.5% in addition to the CET 1 Capital of 4.5% 
 A separate capital buffer requirement for systemically important institutions of 1% CET 
1 capital from July 1, 2015, increased to 2% CET 1 capital from July 1, 2016 
 A statutory authority to issue rules on a counter-cyclical capital buffer requirement of 
between 0 and 2.5% of CET 1 capital (Ministry of Finance, Norway, 2013) 
                                                 
14
 The risk associated with the entire market as opposed to risk of an individual business or a firm. 
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Figure 3 summarizes the phase-in arrangements for the Norwegian capital requirements:
 
The capital requirements proposed by the Norwegian government exceeds those set in Basel 
III to a substantial degree.  
3.1 Stricter Norwegian rules for risk-weighting mortgages 
The Norwegian government also recently announced new rules regarding how banks can 
risk-weight their mortgage loans. Banks employ risk weights based on either their internal 
risk models (the IRB approach) or as per standards set by authorities (standardized approach). 
Historically, banks have faced low losses on mortgage loans and hence, under the IRB 
approach, they set very low risk-weights (Ministry of Finance, Norway, 2012). The Ministry 
of Finance has suggested banks to employ a weight floor of 35 % of value on mortgage loans 
in order to reflect the high risk associated with rising household indebtedness and house 
prices (Bloomberg, 2013). We will also isolate the effect this has on DNBs cost of capital. 
4.5% 4.5% 4.5% 4.5%
2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 2.5%
2.0%
3.0% 3.0% 3.0%
2.5% 2.5% 2.5%
1.0%
2.0%
0.0%
2.0%
4.0%
6.0%
8.0%
10.0%
12.0%
14.0%
16.0%
July 1, 2013 July 1, 2014 July 1, 2015 July 1, 2016
Figure 3: Phase-in arrangements for Norwegian Capital Requirements
CET 1 Capital Conservation Buffer
Systemic Risk Buffer Countercyclical Buffer
Buffer for Systemically Important Banks
(Source: Ministry of Finance, Government of Norway, 2013)
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4. Analysis 
We use the following methodology to assess the impact of higher capital requirements on 
cost of capital of DNB Bank ASA. 
1. Find Levered Beta
15
 of Equity (βlev) of DNB Bank ASA by comparing stock returns 
with Oslo Bors Stock Exchange Index (OBX) and Market Risk Premium
16
 (MRP) by 
comparing OBX returns with risk-free rate 
2. Find Beta of debt (βd) of DNB by comparing returns on its bond-fund Lang Obligasjon 
20 with OBX. 
3. Find unlevered beta
17
 (βu) using DNB's debt (D) and equity (E) 
          [
 
  (   ) 
]     [
(   ) 
  (   ) 
] 
4. Estimate new capital structure for DNB based on Basel III standards and Norwegian 
capital requirements 
5. Levering the Beta based on debt and equity according to new capital structure norms 
          [  (   )
 
 
]     [(   )
 
 
] 
6. Find expected return on stock using Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
            (     ) 
7. Find Post Tax Return on Debt issued by DNB  
                  (   ) 
8. Find Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) 
          [
 
   
]     [
 
   
] 
                                                 
15
 Volatility of returns of a stock compared to the market. 
16
 The excess of returns obtained from the market compared to the risk-free rate of return 
17
 The beta of a company without any debt 
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4.1 Levered Equity Beta of DNB Bank ASA and Market 
Risk Premium 
The levered equity beta of DNB Bank ASA was found by benchmarking the monthly returns 
on its stock with monthly returns of Oslo Bors Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OBX). 
Monthly returns of DNB Bank ASA and OBX were compared with the monthly risk-free rate 
(see Table A.1 in the Appendix). The monthly risk-free rate pertaining to respective periods 
were obtained from the average annual yield of the 10-year Norwegian Government Bond 
(refer Table A.2 in Appendix). Data for the last 20-years, 15-years and 10-years was analysed 
and compared to find the sensitivity of DNB Bank ASA with OBX. The following scatter 
plots were obtained based on the analysis: 
 
Figure 4: Equity Beta of DNB Bank ASA based on 20-year data 
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Figure 5: Equity Beta of DNB Bank ASA based on 15-year data 
 
Figure 6: Equity Beta of DNB Bank ASA based on 10-year data 
The slopes of the trend-lines of the scatter plot depict the levered equity beta of DNB Bank 
ASA. 
The monthly Market Risk Premium (MRP) was calculated from the excess of monthly 
returns of OBX over the risk-free rate. The monthly MRP was annualised to get Annual MRP 
based on 10-year data. The Market Risk Premium was found to be 5.14%. This is in 
accordance with both median (5,00 %) and average (5,50 %) for what Norwegian analysts 
and academics use (Fernandez, et al., 2011). 
The value of levered equity beta for DNB Bank ASA and Annual MRP based on analysis of 
different years’ data of returns of DNB Bank ASA and OBX are presented below:  
Equity Beta of DNB Bank ASA  20-year 
data 
15-year 
data 
10-year 
data 
Correlation coefficient
18
 between returns of DNB Bank ASA 
and OBX 
0.56 0.58 0.52 
Standard Deviation
19
 of Returns of DNB Bank ASA 0.09 0.10 0.09 
Standard Deviation of Returns of OBX 0.08 0.09 0.10 
Leveraged Equity Beta of DNB Bank ASA 0.64 0.61 0.50 
                                                 
18
 A measure of linear relationship between two variables. 
19
 A measure of how much a data set is spread from its mean. 
y = 0.4997x + 0.0071
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Table 5: Leveraged Equity Beta  
4.2 Debt Beta of DNB Bank ASA 
To calculate the debt beta we regressed DNB Lang Obligasjon 20 against returns from OBX 
(see Table A.3 in the appendix). We used the last five years of data to undertake the analysis. 
The debt fund was chosen based on the fact that it invests in high quality interest bearing 
securities similar to DNBs issued debt, uses NOK and is an open-ended fund that was 
launched in 2002.  
The following scatter plot was obtained based on the analysis: 
 
Figure 7: Debt Beta of DNB Bank ASA based on returns of DNB Lang Obligasjon 20 
The slopes of the trend-lines of the scatter plot depict that the debt beta of DNB Bank ASA is 
-0.05. 
Additionally, the following results were obtained which indicates the debt beta of DNB Bank 
ASA is indeed -0.05. 
Debt Beta of DNB Bank ASA Values 
Correlation coefficient between returns of DNB Lang Obligasjon 20 and OBX -0.21 
y = -0.0495x + 0.003
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Standard Deviation of Returns of DNB Lang Obligasjon 20 0.02 
Standard Deviation of Returns of OBX 0.07 
Leveraged debt Beta of DNB Bank ASA 
                            
                    
             
 
-0.05 
Table 6: Debt Beta of DNB Bank ASA 
The negative beta of debt indicates that the returns on debt for DNB Bank ASA are lower than the risk 
free rate in a well diversified market portfolio. Overall, the investment represents an insurance against 
systematic shocks inherent in the market. A similar negative beta is observed in securitized gold 
funds. 
4.3 Unlevered Beta of DNB Bank ASA 
Unlevered beta of DNB Bank ASA was calculated using the existing market value of its 
equity and debt reported by the bank in its 2013 Quarter 1 Report which are presented below: 
(Million NOK, unless specified otherwise) 
Equity (E) Value of DNB Bank ASA   
Stock Price as on 31.05.2013 (NOK) 95.45 
Shares Outstanding (Million) 1,628.80 
Market Value of Equity (E) 155,469 
Table 7: Equity Value of DNB Bank ASA 
(Million NOK, unless specified otherwise) 
Debt (D) Value of DNB Bank ASA  
Due to Credit Institutions 359,158 
Deposits from Customers 862,164 
Financial Derivatives 93,318 
Debt Securities 375,939 
Subordinated Loan Capital 18,610 
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Total Value of Debt (D) 1,709,189 
Table 8: Debt Value of DNB Bank ASA 
From the levered equity beta (    ) and debt beta (  )found earlier and the taxation rate (t) of 
28% in Norway, the unlevered beta (  ) of DNB Bank ASA was calculated using:  
          [
 
  (   ) 
]     [
(   ) 
  (   ) 
] 
The unlevered beta of DNB Bank ASA was found to be 0.01. 
4.4 New Capital Structure based on Basel III standards 
and Norwegian Capital Requirements 
The new capital structure based on Basel III standards and Norwegian Capital Requirements 
was found by using the following methodology and assumptions: 
 The present RWA level of the bank (NOK 891,346 million on March 31, 2013), was 
observed from its 2013 Quarter 1 results  
 The probable RWA levels at the completion of the capital requirements phase-in 
arrangements was estimated to be ranging from a decrease of 20%, 15%, 10%, 5% to 
an increase of 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%. The reason we estimate at different variations of 
RWA is because of the estimation uncertainty associated with the new proposed rules 
for risk weighting DNBs assets.  
 At different levels of RWA, the total CET 1 capital, total tier 1 capital and total 
primary capital was estimated based on the capital requirements standards 
 The total primary capital was compared with the existing primary capital. If an 
additional primary capital is required to fulfil the capital requirements standards, it 
was assumed to be raised through issuance of equity 
 It was assumed that the market value of the bank’s equity will not fall on issuance of 
new equity. This is in accordance with earlier discussions indicating that the 
signalling value is removed when the cause of the issuance is mandated by the 
regulator. 
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 Debt of the bank was assumed to be at the existing levels, that is, as observed from 
2013 Quarter 1 results 
 For the Norwegian legislation, for sensitivity analysis, the retail mortgage loans have 
been adjusted in the same proportion of RWA  
 For the Norwegian legislation, the risk-weight on mortgage loans has been changed 
from the existing 22.8% level to 35% level as required by the new rules 
The capital requirements stipulated by Basel III norms is summarised below:  
Capital Requirements as per Basel III Standards % of RWA 
CET 1 Capital 4.5% 
Capital Conservation Buffer (Additional CET 1 capital) 2.5% 
Countercyclical Buffer (Additional CET 1 capital) 2.5% 
Total CET 1 Capital 9.5% 
Additional Tier 1 Capital 1.5% 
Total Tier 1 Capital 11.0% 
Tier 2 Capital 2.0% 
Total Primary Capital 13.0% 
Table 9: Capital Requirements as per Basel III standards 
The capital structure of DNB Bank ASA at different levels of RWA based on the Basel III 
capital requirements standards (2019 onwards) is as follows:  
(Million NOK, unless specified otherwise) 
Change in RWA compared 
to existing RWA 
-20.0% -15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 
RWA 
                   
713,077  
             
757,644  
          
802,211  
             
846,779  
         
891,346  
       
935,913  
       
980,481  
    
1,025,048  
    
1,069,615  
Total CET 1 Capital 
Required 
                     
67,742  
               
71,976  
             
76,210  
               
80,444  
           
84,678  
          
88,912  
          
93,146  
          
97,380  
       
101,613  
Additional Tier 1 Capital 
Required 
                     
10,696  
               
11,365  
             
12,033  
               
12,702  
           
13,370  
          
14,039  
          
14,707  
          
15,376  
          
16,044  
Tier 2 Capital Required 
                     
14,262  
               
15,153  
             
16,044  
               
16,936  
           
17,827  
          
18,718  
          
19,610  
          
20,501  
          
21,392  
Total Primary Capital 
Required 
                     
92,700  
               
98,494  
          
104,287  
             
110,081  
         
115,875  
       
121,669  
       
127,462  
       
133,256  
       
139,050  
Existing Primary Capital 
                   
116,744  
             
116,744  
          
116,744  
             
116,744  
         
116,744  
       
116,744  
       
116,744  
       
116,744  
       
116,744  
Additional capital to be 
raised through equity 
                              
-    
                         
-    
                      
-    
                         
-    
                    
-    
            
4,925  
          
10,718  
          
16,512  
          
22,306  
Total Number of Shares 
Outstanding  
(Face Value: 10 NOK) 
                 
1,628.80  
            
1,628.80  
         
1,628.80  
            
1,628.80  
       
1,628.80  
      
2,121.27  
      
2,700.65  
      
3,280.02  
      
3,859.40  
Market Value of Equity (E ) 
(assuming no devaluation in 
                   
155,469  
             
155,469  
          
155,469  
             
155,469  
         
155,469  
       
202,475  
       
257,777  
       
313,078  
       
368,380  
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existing market price) 
Debt (assumed constant at 
existing levels) 
               
1,709,189  
         
1,709,189  
       
1,709,189  
         
1,709,189  
     
1,709,189  
    
1,709,189  
    
1,709,189  
    
1,709,189  
    
1,709,189  
Table 10: Capital Structure of DNB Bank ASA at different levels of RWA based on the Basel 
III capital requirements standards (2019 onwards) 
The capital requirements stipulated by Norwegian legislation (Ministry of Finance, Norway, 
2013) is summarised below:  
Capital Requirements as per Basel III Standards % of RWA 
CET 1 Capital 4.5% 
Capital Conservation Buffer (Additional CET 1 capital) 2.5% 
Systemic Risk Buffer (Additional CET 1 capital) 3.0% 
Countercyclical Buffer (Additional CET 1 capital) 2.5% 
Total CET 1 Capital 12.5% 
Buffer for Systemically Important Banks 2.0% 
Total Primary Capital 14.5% 
Table 11: Capital Requirements as per Norwegian legislation 
The capital structure of DNB Bank ASA at different levels of RWA based on the Norwegian 
legislation capital requirements standards (2016 onwards) is as follows:  
(Million NOK, unless specified otherwise) 
Capital Structure with EXISTING risk-weights on mortgage loans 
Change in RWA compared to 
existing RWA 
-20.0% -15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 
RWA at existing risk weights 713,077  757,644  802,211  846,779  891,346  935,913  980,481  1,025,048  1,069,615  
Total CET 1 Capital  89,135   94,706   100,276   105,847   111,418   116,989   122,560   128,131   133,702  
Buffer for Systemically 
Important Banks 
 14,262   15,153   16,044   16,936   17,827   18,718   19,610   20,501   21,392  
Total Primary Capital  103,396   109,858   116,321   122,783   129,245   135,707   142,170   148,632   155,094  
Existing Primary Capital 116,744  116,744  116,744  116,744  116,744  116,744  116,744  116,744  116,744  
Additional capital to be raised 
through issuance of equity 
 -     -     -     6,039   12,501   18,963   25,426   31,888   38,350  
Total Number of Shares 
Outstanding  
(Face Value: 10 NOK) 
 1,628.80   1,628.80   1,628.80   2,232.69   2,878.92   3,525.14   4,171.37   4,817.59   5,463.82  
Market Value of Equity (E ) 
(assuming no devaluation in 
existing market price) 
 155,469   155,469   155,469   213,110   274,793   336,475   398,157   459,839   521,522  
Debt (assumed constant at 
existing levels) 
1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  
Capital Structure with NEW risk-weights on mortgage loans 
Change in RWA compared to 
existing RWA 
-20.0% -15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 
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RWA at existing risk weights 713,077  757,644  802,211  846,779  891,346  935,913  980,481  1,025,048  1,069,615  
Retail Mortgage Loans  54,240   57,630   61,020   64,410   67,800   71,190   74,580   77,970   81,360  
RWA with new risk weights on 
Mortgage Loans 
 783,815   832,804   881,792   930,780   979,769  1,028,757  1,077,746  1,126,734  1,175,723  
Total CET 1 Capital  97,977   104,100   110,224   116,348   122,471   128,595   134,718   140,842   146,965  
Buffer for Systemically 
Important Banks 
 15,676   16,656   17,636   18,616   19,595   20,575   21,555   22,535   23,514  
Total Primary Capital  113,653   120,757   127,860   134,963   142,066   149,170   156,273   163,376   170,480  
Existing Primary Capital 116,744  116,744  116,744  116,744  116,744  116,744  116,744  116,744  116,744  
Additional capital to be raised 
through issuance of equity 
 -     4,013   11,116   18,219   25,322   32,426   39,529   46,632   53,736  
Total Number of Shares 
Outstanding  
(Face Value: 10 NOK) 
 1,628.80   2,030.05   2,740.38   3,450.72   4,161.05   4,871.38   5,581.71   6,292.05   7,002.38  
Market Value of Equity (E ) 
(assuming no devaluation in 
existing market price) 
 155,469   193,768   261,570   329,371   397,172   464,973   532,775   600,576   668,377  
Debt (assumed constant at 
existing levels) 
1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  
Table 12: Capital Structure of DNB Bank ASA at different levels of RWA based on 
Norwegian Legislation capital requirements standards (2016 onwards) 
4.5 Levered Beta of DNB Bank ASA 
The unlevered beta was levered at levels of Debt and Equity arrived at in the previous stage 
based on the capital structure stipulated by the Basel III norms and Norwegian legislation 
using the formula:  
          [  (   )
 
 
]     [(   )
 
 
] 
The levered beta at different levels of RWA and debt-equity mix based on Basel III capital 
requirements is shown below:  
(Million NOK, unless specified otherwise) 
Change in RWA 
compared to existing 
RWA 
-20.0% -15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 
RWA 713,077  757,644  802,211  846,779  891,346  935,913  980,481  1,025,048  1,069,615  
Market Value of Equity (E 
) 
155,469  155,469  155,469  155,469  155,469  202,475  257,777  313,078  368,380  
Debt (assumed constant at 
existing levels) 
1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  1,709,189  
Levered Beta 0.50   0.50    0.50   0.50   0.50  0.39  0.31  0.25  0.22  
Table 13: Levered Beta of DNB Bank ASA at different levels of RWA based on Basel III 
capital requirements standards  
The levered beta at different levels of RWA and debt-equity mix based on Norwegian 
legislation requirements is shown below: 
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(Million NOK, unless specified otherwise) 
Capital Structure with EXISTING risk-weights on mortgage loans 
Change in RWA compared 
to existing RWA 
-20.0% -15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 
RWA 713,077  757,644  802,211  846,779  891,346  935,913  980,481  1,025,048  1,069,615  
Market Value of Equity (E )  155,469   155,469   155,469   213,110   274,793   336,475   398,157   459,839   521,522  
Debt (assumed constant at 
existing levels) 
               
1,709,189  
         
1,709,189  
       
1,709,189  
         
1,709,189  
     
1,709,189  
    
1,709,189  
    
1,709,189  
    
1,709,189  
    
1,709,189  
Levered Beta  0.50   0.50   0.50   0.37   0.29   0.24   0.20   0.18   0.16  
Capital Structure with NEW risk-weights on mortgage loans 
Change in RWA compared 
to existing RWA 
-20.0% -15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 
RWA with new risk weights 
on Mortgage Loans 
 783,815   832,804   881,792   930,780   979,769  1,028,757  1,077,746  1,126,734  1,175,723  
Market Value of Equity (E )  155,469   193,768   261,570   329,371   397,172   464,973   532,775   600,576   668,377  
Debt (assumed constant at 
existing levels) 
               
1,709,189  
         
1,709,189  
       
1,709,189  
         
1,709,189  
     
1,709,189  
    
1,709,189  
    
1,709,189  
    
1,709,189  
    
1,709,189  
Levered Beta  0.50   0.40   0.30   0.24   0.20   0.18   0.15   0.14   0.13  
Table 14: Levered Beta of DNB Bank ASA at different levels of RWA based on Norwegian 
legislation capital requirements standards 
4.6 Expected Return on Stock using CAPM 
Using the levered beta (    ) and the Market Risk Premium (5.14%) calculated in the 
previous stages, the expected return on stock of DNB Bank ASA is calculated using Capital 
Asset Pricing Model 
                
The expected return on stock at different levels of RWA and debt-equity mix based on Basel 
III capital requirements is shown below: 
(Million NOK, unless specified otherwise) 
Change in RWA 
compared to existing 
RWA 
-20.0% -15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 
RWA 713,077  757,644  802,211  846,779  891,346  935,913  980,481  1,025,048  1,069,615  
Expected Return on 
Equity  
4.80% 4.80% 4.80% 4.80% 4.80% 4.22% 3.80% 3.54% 3.35% 
Table 15: Expected Return on Stock of DNB Bank ASA at different levels of RWA based on 
Basel III capital requirements standards 
The expected return on stock at different levels of RWA and debt-equity mix based on 
Norwegian legislation capital requirements is shown below: 
(Million NOK, unless specified otherwise) 
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Capital Structure with EXISTING risk-weights on mortgage loans 
Change in RWA 
compared to existing 
RWA 
-20.0% -15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 
RWA 713,077  757,644  802,211  846,779  891,346  935,913  980,481  1,025,048  1,069,615  
Expected Return on 
Equity  
4.80% 4.80% 4.80% 4.12% 3.71% 3.45% 3.27% 3.14% 3.04% 
Capital Structure with NEW risk-weights on mortgage loans 
Change in RWA 
compared to existing 
RWA 
-20.0% -15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 
RWA with new risk 
weights on Mortgage 
Loans 
 783,815   832,804   881,792   930,780   979,769  1,028,757  1,077,746  1,126,734  1,175,723  
Expected Return on 
Equity  
4.80% 4.30% 3.78% 3.47% 3.27% 3.13% 3.02% 2.94% 2.87% 
Table 16: Expected Return on Stock of DNB Bank ASA at different levels of RWA based on 
Norwegian legislation capital requirements standards 
4.7 Post-tax Return on Debt issued by DNB Bank ASA 
The post-tax return on debt (NOK 1,709,189 million) issued by DNB Bank ASA was 
calculated based on the interest expense (NOK 5,564 million for the quarter ending March 
31, 2013) reported by the bank in its 2013 Quarter 1 report. The annual post-tax return was 
thus observed to be  
                  (   )  
     
         
            (     )         
4.8 Weighted Average Cost of Capital 
The weighted average cost of capital for DNB Bank ASA was calculated using the expected 
return on equity (Re), return on debt (Rd), expected market value of Equity (E) and Debt (D) 
using:  
          [
 
   
]     [
 
   
] 
WACC at different levels of RWA based on Basel III capital requirements is shown below: 
(Million NOK, unless specified otherwise) 
Change in RWA 
compared to existing 
RWA 
-20.0% -15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 
RWA  713,077  757,644  802,211  846,779  891,346  935,913  980,481  1,025,048  1,069,615  
WACC 1.26% 1.26% 1.26% 1.26% 1.26% 1.28% 1.31% 1.34% 1.37% 
36 
 
36 
 
Table 17: WACC of DNB Bank ASA at different levels of RWA based on Basel III capital 
requirements standards 
WACC at different levels of RWA based on Norwegian legislation capital requirements is 
shown below: 
(Million NOK, unless specified otherwise) 
Capital Structure with EXISTING risk-weights on mortgage loans 
Change in RWA 
compared to existing 
RWA 
-20.0% -15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 
RWA 713,077  757,644  802,211  846,779  891,346  935,913  980,481  1,025,048  1,069,615  
WACC 1.26% 1.26% 1.26% 1.29% 1.32% 1.35% 1.38% 1.40% 1.43% 
Capital Structure with NEW risk-weights on mortgage loans 
Change in RWA 
compared to existing 
RWA 
-20.0% -15.0% -10.0% -5.0% 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 15.0% 20.0% 
RWA with new risk 
weights on Mortgage 
Loans 
 783,815   832,804   881,792   930,780   979,769  1,028,757  1,077,746  1,126,734  1,175,723  
WACC 1.26% 1.28% 1.31% 1.35% 1.38% 1.41% 1.43% 1.46% 1.48% 
Table 18: WACC of DNB Bank ASA at different levels of RWA based on Norwegian 
legislation capital requirements standards 
Figure 8 summarizes the analysis of cost of capital for DNB Bank ASA at different RWA 
levels:  
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Figure 8: Cost of Capital for DNB Bank ASA
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4.9 Chronological review of Cost of Capital 
The cost of capital of DNB Bank ASA was assessed from its capital structure in the past and 
going forward, based on the capital requirements proposed by Basel III and Norwegian 
legislation. In carrying out this analysis, the Market Risk Premium, tax rate and the beta of 
debt was assumed to be constant at the existing levels, whereas the other parameters of 
Capital Asset Pricing Model were observed as follows:  
(Million NOK, unless specified otherwise) 
Comparison of Cost of Capital December 2008 December 2012 March 2013 
2015  
(Estimated - 
After adhering 
to Norwegian 
Legislation with 
EXISTING risk 
weights on 
mortgages) 
2015  
(Estimated - 
After adhering 
to Norwegian 
Legislation with 
NEW risk 
weights on 
mortgages) 
Outstanding shares (million)  1,332.7   1,628.8   1,628.8  2,878.92  4,161.0 
Share Price (NOK)  27.00   66.60   95.45  95.45  95.45  
Market Value of Equity   35,981.55   108,478.08   155,468.96  274,792.63  397,172.09  
Due to Credit Institutions   147,371   283,093   359,158   359,158   359,158  
Deposits from Customers   570,312   787,245   862,164   862,164   862,164  
Financial Derivatives   119,168   92,653   93,318   93,318   93,318  
Debt Securities   507,680   414,998   375,939   375,939   375,939  
Subordinated Loan Capital   43,612   21,090   18,610   18,610   18,610  
Total Debt (D)  1,388,143   1,599,079   1,709,189   1,709,189   1,709,189  
Interest Expense  53,373                  26,391                   5,564                   5,564                    5,564  
Post Tax Return on Debt 2.8% 1.2% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 
Leveraged Beta of Equity  0.46   0.52   0.50   0.50   0.20  
Beta of Debt (assumed constant) -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  -0.05  
Risk free Rate 4.47% 2.10% 2.23% 2.23% 2.23% 
Expected Return on Equity  6.84% 4.78% 4.80% 3.71% 3.27% 
Weighted Average Cost of 
Capital 
2.87% 1.42% 1.26% 1.32% 1.38% 
Table 19: Chronological Review of Cost of Capital of DNB Bank ASA 
Figure 9 summarizes the chronological cost of capital of the bank: 
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4.10    Critical Assessment of Methodology 
Our methodology analyses the cost of capital once the bank adheres to the capital 
requirement complete their phase-in. This is 2019 for Basel III and 2016 for Norwegian 
legislation.  
The Capital Asset Pricing Model has certain underlying assumptions which may not hold in 
the true world. Specifically, it ignores transaction costs and taxation on equity returns.  It also 
assumes that the capital markets are completely efficient with a free flow of information and 
that investors are completely rational in making their investment decisions. It gives an 
analysis of return that is pertaining only to systematic risk while assuming that investors do 
not assume any unsystematic risk because of diversification.  
It is not feasible to explore all the possible scenarios by changing all the variables that affect 
the bank’s capital cost. The assumptions underlying the above methodology may be exactly 
accurate, but are close estimations based on current circumstances.  
The risk-free rate and thereby, the Market Risk Premium may change going forward. If the 
risk-free rate and the MRP fall significantly, the expected return on stock of DNB Bank ASA 
will be fall, resulting in a lower cost of capital.  
Given DNB Bank ASAs continuously changing capital structure, it might be simplistic to 
assume that the level of debt remains constant. If the level of debt in the bank’s capital 
structure increases, the overall cost of capital will be lower.  
2.87%
1.42%
1.26% 1.32% 1.38%
0.00%
0.50%
1.00%
1.50%
2.00%
2.50%
3.00%
3.50%
December 2008 December 2012 March 2013 2015
(Post-Norwegian
Legislation with
EXISTING risk
weights)
2015
(Post-Norwegian
Legislation with
NEW risk
weights)
Figure 9: Chronological Cost of Capital for DNB Bank 
ASA
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DNB Bank ASA has had significant profits (NOK 13,423 million for year 2012) and can 
hence, source its primary capital requirement from retained earnings. It may not require 
issuance of equity to meet the entire gap of its existing equity and equity required by the 
capital requirement standards. If the bank satisfies the proposed capital requirement through 
its retained earnings, its cost of capital may not rise as much. 
The assumption that the price of stock will not change on issuance of new shares may not 
hold if DNB actually has to issue new equity. However as argued by Admanti, et al. (2011), 
if the negative signal associated with equity issuance is removed because of regulatory 
observance, the price of stock may not decrease significantly, as is the case for DNB.  
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5. Discussion 
We estimated DNB Bank ASAs capital structure under future capital requirements stipulated 
by Basel III and Norwegian legislation rules. While the methodology above find changes in 
cost of capital that are reasonable, certain finds might surprise outsiders. 
For almost all academic purposes, the beta of debt is assumed to be zero. This implies that 
there is no risk involved in receiving interest payments and principal repayments on debt 
assumed by an entity. A beta of debt implies no risk of bankruptcy. Researching a highly 
leveraged financial institution, we found this assumption to be inaccurate. Our methodology 
found the risk involved for owners debt owed by DNB Bank ASA compared to market 
returns, thereby finding the beta of DNB Bank ASA’s debt. Our findings confirm the 
arguments laid forth by DNBs CFO, stating the depositor insurance and implicit guarantees 
on this state-owned bank, make their debt more of a safe haven (as gold) than a normal risky 
asset.  
The estimation of MRP is based on 10-year comparison of returns on OBX compared to the 
returns on 10-year bonds issued by the Norwegian government. The MRP for Norway widely 
used by academicians, analysts and managers has a median of 5.0% and an average of 5.5% 
(Fernandez, et al., 2011). The cost of capital is not highly sensitive to MRP within these 
bounds. This is evident from the following table showing the sensitivity of cost of capital 
using existing capital structure, Basel III standards, Norwegian legislation with existing risk-
weights and Norwegian legislation with new risk weights at different levels of MRP. While 
the changes will be larger if we use more extreme MRP estimates, it is unlikely to affect our 
conclusions. 
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Weighted Average Cost of Capital (%) 
MRP 
March 2013 
(Existing capital 
structure) 
2015   
(Norwegian 
Legislation with 
EXISTING risk 
weights on 
mortgages) 
2015   
(Norwegian 
Legislation with 
NEW risk weights 
on mortgages) 
2019 
(Basel III Capital 
Requirements) 
5.00% 1.26% 1.32% 1.37% 1.25% 
5.10% 1.26% 1.32% 1.38% 1.26% 
5.14% (calculated value) 1.26% 1.32% 1.38% 1.26% 
5.20% 1.26% 1.32% 1.38% 1.26% 
5.30% 1.26% 1.33% 1.38% 1.27% 
5.40% 1.26% 1.33% 1.39% 1.27% 
5.50% 1.26% 1.34% 1.39% 1.27% 
Table 20: Sensitivity analysis of DNB Bank ASA’s cost of capital with Market Risk Premium 
We observe that at higher levels of RWA, DNB Bank ASA requires higher primary capital to 
maintain their capital adequacy ratios. Beyond retaining profits, DNB Bank ASA may have 
to issue equity. As RWA levels increase, the levered beta falls, implying a lower expected 
return on DNB Bank ASA’s equity. However, while the expected return on the bank’s equity 
falls in this scenario, there would be a significant increase in equity of DNB Bank ASA in its 
overall capital structure. This increase in equity would more than offset the fall in return on 
equity, giving rise to an increase in the overall cost of capital. 
With the implementation of new capital requirement standards, DNB Bank ASA has 
announced an increase of 0.3% on interest on its mortgage loans. Other banks are expected to 
follow DNB Bank ASA’s lead and increase their mortgage rates as well (The Foreigner, 
2013). We find the increase in cost of capital for DNB to be 0.12% (1.26% increasing to 
1.38%, as per Norwegian legislation). The increase by DNB Bank ASA and other banks in 
their mortgage rates exceeds the effect on cost of capital due to the new capital requirements. 
It indicates lacking competition in the Norwegian banking market. The Norwegian banking 
market show tendencies to be oligopolistic in nature wherein a group of firms exert control 
on the overall market. The banks seem to be profiteering by increasing interest rates under the 
pretext of capital requirement standards. In the long run, end-consumers would end up 
suffering high costs. The Government of Norway would do well to take measures to increase 
competition in the Norwegian banking market in order to keep lending rates in check, to the 
benefit of Norwegian consumers and businesses.  
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6. Conclusion 
Using the Capital Asset Pricing Model method, we find that raising equity levels in the 
capital structure of DNB Bank ASA, raises the weighted average cost of capital. This stems 
from the fact that tax treatment on debt favours capital funded by debt rather than equity. 
Additionally, the asymmetry of information between management and outsiders gives rise to 
the pecking order, wherein management is averse to raising equity externally and tends to use 
retained earnings as a substitute. In the case of DNB Bank ASA, it is observed that the cost of 
capital increases as the bank assumes higher levels of RWA. Comparing the Basel III 
standards to the Norwegian legislation on capital requirements, the bank has to assume a 
higher cost of capital to adhere to the requirements of Norwegian legislation. Even at present 
levels of RWA, the bank’s cost of capital increases from 1.26% as per Basel III requirements 
to 1.38% as per Norwegian legislation (with new risk-weights).  
While noticeable for a large bank, this difference does not alone justify the increase of 0.3 
percentage points in mortgage interest rate DNB levied on its customers. The interest rate 
increase seems to be too high by more than two-fold.  
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8. Appendix 
Table A.1: Oslo Bors Stock Exchange Benchmark Index (OBX) and DNB Bank ASA 
Returns 
Date 
Monthly 
Risk-free 
Rate 
OBX 
Value 
Monthly 
Returns 
OBX Monthly 
Real Yield 
(Return over risk- free 
rate) 
DNB 
Stock 
Values 
(NOK) 
Monthly Returns 
DNB Monthly  
Real Yield  
(Return over risk- free 
rate) 
28.05.93 0.57% 303.57 - - 12.25 - - 
30.06.93 0.57% 312.25 2.86% 2.29% 14.15 15.51% 14.94% 
30.07.93 0.57% 338.28 8.34% 7.76% 16.20 14.49% 13.92% 
31.08.93 0.57% 360.70 6.63% 6.06% 17.00 4.94% 4.37% 
30.09.93 0.57% 342.24 -5.12% -5.69% 16.70 -1.76% -2.34% 
29.10.93 0.57% 387.27 13.16% 12.59% 20.00 19.76% 19.19% 
30.11.93 0.57% 357.07 -7.80% -8.37% 19.10 -4.50% -5.07% 
30.12.93 0.57% 385.51 7.96% 7.39% 16.85 -11.78% -12.35% 
31.01.94 0.62% 431.29 11.88% 11.25% 21.50 27.60% 26.97% 
28.02.94 0.62% 433.05 0.41% -0.21% 19.70 -8.37% -8.99% 
30.03.94 0.62% 395.86 -8.59% -9.21% 16.50 -16.24% -16.87% 
29.04.94 0.62% 395.53 -0.08% -0.71% 19.00 15.15% 14.53% 
31.05.94 0.62% 393.01 -0.64% -1.26% 16.60 -12.63% -13.25% 
30.06.94 0.62% 367.10 -6.59% -7.21% 15.90 -4.22% -4.84% 
29.07.94 0.62% 400.69 9.15% 8.53% 16.25 2.20% 1.58% 
31.08.94 0.62% 398.79 -0.47% -1.10% 16.90 4.00% 3.38% 
30.09.94 0.62% 361.12 -9.45% -10.07% 15.80 -6.51% -7.13% 
31.10.94 0.62% 368.80 2.13% 1.51% 17.00 7.59% 6.97% 
30.11.94 0.62% 381.45 3.43% 2.81% 17.00 0.00% -0.62% 
30.12.94 0.62% 403.37 5.75% 5.12% 18.40 8.24% 7.61% 
31.01.95 0.62% 400.49 -0.71% -1.33% 18.30 -0.54% -1.16% 
28.02.95 0.62% 382.01 -4.61% -5.23% 17.00 -7.10% -7.72% 
31.03.95 0.62% 361.75 -5.30% -5.92% 16.50 -2.94% -3.56% 
28.04.95 0.62% 391.31 8.17% 7.55% 16.50 0.00% -0.62% 
31.05.95 0.62% 390.65 -0.17% -0.79% 16.40 -0.61% -1.23% 
30.06.95 0.62% 403.29 3.24% 2.62% 16.70 1.83% 1.21% 
31.07.95 0.62% 411.89 2.13% 1.51% 17.20 2.99% 2.37% 
31.08.95 0.62% 407.75 -1.01% -1.62% 16.70 -2.91% -3.53% 
29.09.95 0.62% 414.34 1.62% 1.00% 17.30 3.59% 2.97% 
31.10.95 0.62% 397.62 -4.04% -4.65% 17.10 -1.16% -1.78% 
30.11.95 0.62% 400.47 0.72% 0.10% 16.60 -2.92% -3.54% 
29.12.95 0.62% 407.06 1.65% 1.03% 16.60 0.00% -0.62% 
31.01.96 0.57% 413.00 1.46% 0.89% 17.80 7.23% 6.66% 
29.02.96 0.57% 423.90 2.64% 2.07% 20.80 16.85% 16.29% 
29.03.96 0.57% 426.82 0.69% 0.12% 19.90 -4.33% -4.89% 
30.04.96 0.57% 459.76 7.72% 7.15% 18.90 -5.03% -5.59% 
31.05.96 0.57% 458.62 -0.25% -0.81% 19.60 3.70% 3.14% 
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Date 
Monthly 
Risk-free 
Rate 
OBX 
Value 
Monthly 
Returns 
OBX Monthly 
Real Yield 
(Return over risk- free 
rate) 
DNB 
Stock 
Values 
(NOK) 
Monthly Returns 
DNB Monthly  
Real Yield  
(Return over risk- free 
rate) 
28.06.96 0.57% 455.08 -0.77% -1.34% 19.70 0.51% -0.05% 
31.07.96 0.57% 437.43 -3.88% -4.44% 20.20 2.54% 1.97% 
30.08.96 0.57% 450.36 2.96% 2.39% 20.60 1.98% 1.42% 
30.09.96 0.57% 462.14 2.62% 2.05% 20.70 0.49% -0.08% 
31.10.96 0.57% 478.90 3.63% 3.06% 21.20 2.42% 1.85% 
29.11.96 0.57% 509.87 6.47% 5.90% 24.00 13.21% 12.64% 
30.12.96 0.57% 532.58 4.45% 3.89% 24.40 1.67% 1.10% 
31.01.97 0.49% 577.61 8.46% 7.96% 26.60 9.02% 8.53% 
28.02.97 0.49% 585.07 1.29% 0.80% 30.00 12.78% 12.29% 
26.03.97 0.49% 591.66 1.13% 0.64% 28.60 -4.67% -5.16% 
30.04.97 0.49% 600.77 1.54% 1.05% 25.70 -10.14% -10.63% 
30.05.97 0.49% 632.29 5.25% 4.76% 27.90 8.56% 8.07% 
30.06.97 0.49% 650.06 2.81% 2.32% 28.70 2.87% 2.38% 
31.07.97 0.49% 698.81 7.50% 7.01% 32.10 11.85% 11.36% 
29.08.97 0.49% 684.54 -2.04% -2.53% 30.50 -4.98% -5.48% 
30.09.97 0.49% 709.68 3.67% 3.18% 29.70 -2.62% -3.11% 
31.10.97 0.49% 695.54 -1.99% -2.48% 31.70 6.73% 6.24% 
28.11.97 0.49% 663.80 -4.56% -5.05% 30.60 -3.47% -3.96% 
30.12.97 0.49% 676.36 1.89% 1.40% 34.80 13.73% 13.23% 
30.01.98 0.45% 655.93 -3.02% -3.47% 33.20 -4.60% -5.05% 
27.02.98 0.45% 685.20 4.46% 4.01% 41.70 25.60% 25.15% 
31.03.98 0.45% 733.75 7.09% 6.64% 41.50 -0.48% -0.93% 
30.04.98 0.45% 747.75 1.91% 1.46% 39.20 -5.54% -5.99% 
29.05.98 0.45% 687.41 -8.07% -8.52% 40.50 3.32% 2.87% 
30.06.98 0.45% 692.16 0.69% 0.24% 40.20 -0.74% -1.19% 
31.07.98 0.45% 681.64 -1.52% -1.97% 41.40 2.99% 2.54% 
31.08.98 0.45% 520.68 -23.61% -24.06% 28.00 -32.37% -32.82% 
30.09.98 0.45% 469.47 -9.84% -10.29% 23.20 -17.14% -17.59% 
30.10.98 0.45% 547.65 16.65% 16.20% 25.90 11.64% 11.19% 
30.11.98 0.45% 514.64 -6.03% -6.48% 29.00 11.97% 11.52% 
30.12.98 0.45% 501.81 -2.49% -2.94% 26.30 -9.31% -9.76% 
29.01.99 0.46% 551.60 9.92% 9.46% 32.20 22.43% 21.97% 
26.02.99 0.46% 523.30 -5.13% -5.59% 27.80 -13.66% -14.12% 
31.03.99 0.46% 560.87 7.18% 6.72% 28.30 1.80% 1.34% 
30.04.99 0.46% 597.69 6.56% 6.10% 28.20 -0.35% -0.81% 
31.05.99 0.46% 590.71 -1.17% -1.63% 27.40 -2.84% -3.30% 
30.06.99 0.46% 584.12 -1.12% -1.58% 26.00 -5.11% -5.57% 
30.07.99 0.46% 598.81 2.51% 2.05% 27.00 3.85% 3.39% 
31.08.99 0.46% 622.44 3.95% 3.49% 31.30 15.93% 15.47% 
30.09.99 0.46% 624.65 0.36% -0.10% 30.60 -2.24% -2.70% 
29.10.99 0.46% 603.44 -3.40% -3.86% 30.40 -0.65% -1.11% 
30.11.99 0.46% 647.27 7.26% 6.80% 32.60 7.24% 6.78% 
30.12.99 0.46% 713.91 10.30% 9.84% 32.90 0.92% 0.46% 
31.01.00 0.52% 677.13 -5.15% -5.67% 30.10 -8.51% -9.03% 
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Date 
Monthly 
Risk-free 
Rate 
OBX 
Value 
Monthly 
Returns 
OBX Monthly 
Real Yield 
(Return over risk- free 
rate) 
DNB 
Stock 
Values 
(NOK) 
Monthly Returns 
DNB Monthly  
Real Yield  
(Return over risk- free 
rate) 
29.02.00 0.52% 708.82 4.68% 4.16% 30.40 1.00% 0.48% 
31.03.00 0.52% 718.88 1.42% 0.90% 32.40 6.58% 6.06% 
28.04.00 0.52% 698.76 -2.80% -3.32% 31.40 -3.09% -3.60% 
31.05.00 0.52% 725.92 3.89% 3.37% 31.80 1.27% 0.76% 
30.06.00 0.52% 763.65 5.20% 4.68% 35.60 11.95% 11.43% 
31.07.00 0.52% 792.78 3.81% 3.30% 36.50 2.53% 2.01% 
31.08.00 0.52% 878.66 10.83% 10.31% 41.20 12.88% 12.36% 
29.09.00 0.52% 857.46 -2.41% -2.93% 39.50 -4.13% -4.64% 
31.10.00 0.52% 858.68 0.14% -0.38% 40.30 2.03% 1.51% 
30.11.00 0.52% 779.11 -9.27% -9.78% 42.70 5.96% 5.44% 
29.12.00 0.52% 783.66 0.58% 0.07% 47.50 11.24% 10.72% 
31.01.01 0.52% 794.73 1.41% 0.89% 43.00 -9.47% -9.99% 
28.02.01 0.52% 793.78 -0.12% -0.64% 45.40 5.58% 5.06% 
30.03.01 0.52% 728.81 -8.18% -8.70% 41.40 -8.81% -9.33% 
30.04.01 0.52% 769.32 5.56% 5.04% 40.00 -3.38% -3.90% 
31.05.01 0.52% 781.12 1.53% 1.01% 39.60 -1.00% -1.52% 
29.06.01 0.52% 743.46 -4.82% -5.34% 40.50 2.27% 1.75% 
31.07.01 0.52% 725.20 -2.46% -2.98% 40.00 -1.23% -1.75% 
31.08.01 0.52% 690.90 -4.73% -5.25% 43.80 9.50% 8.98% 
28.09.01 0.52% 571.42 -17.29% -17.81% 33.00 -24.66% -25.18% 
31.10.01 0.52% 582.12 1.87% 1.35% 33.60 1.82% 1.30% 
30.11.01 0.52% 621.24 6.72% 6.20% 37.30 11.01% 10.49% 
28.12.01 0.52% 650.32 4.68% 4.16% 40.40 8.31% 7.79% 
31.01.02 0.53% 635.61 -2.26% -2.79% 41.00 1.49% 0.95% 
28.02.02 0.53% 642.87 1.14% 0.61% 44.70 9.02% 8.49% 
27.03.02 0.53% 694.74 8.07% 7.54% 46.60 4.25% 3.72% 
30.04.02 0.53% 654.48 -5.79% -6.33% 44.40 -4.72% -5.25% 
31.05.02 0.53% 630.42 -3.68% -4.21% 41.50 -6.53% -7.06% 
28.06.02 0.53% 572.35 -9.21% -9.74% 40.90 -1.45% -1.98% 
31.07.02 0.53% 522.92 -8.64% -9.17% 38.50 -5.87% -6.40% 
30.08.02 0.53% 505.25 -3.38% -3.91% 38.10 -1.04% -1.57% 
30.09.02 0.53% 427.54 -15.38% -15.91% 32.40 -14.96% -15.49% 
31.10.02 0.53% 452.79 5.91% 5.37% 34.30 5.86% 5.33% 
29.11.02 0.53% 487.19 7.60% 7.07% 35.90 4.66% 4.13% 
30.12.02 0.53% 443.40 -8.99% -9.52% 32.60 -9.19% -9.72% 
31.01.03 0.42% 420.51 -5.16% -5.58% 33.40 2.45% 2.03% 
28.02.03 0.42% 389.36 -7.41% -7.83% 27.10 -18.86% -19.28% 
31.03.03 0.42% 399.26 2.54% 2.12% 28.70 5.90% 5.48% 
30.04.03 0.42% 444.16 11.25% 10.83% 33.40 16.38% 15.96% 
30.05.03 0.42% 460.05 3.58% 3.16% 36.40 8.98% 8.56% 
30.06.03 0.42% 496.16 7.85% 7.43% 35.60 -2.20% -2.62% 
31.07.03 0.42% 536.21 8.07% 7.65% 37.50 5.34% 4.92% 
29.08.03 0.42% 563.34 5.06% 4.64% 35.10 -6.40% -6.82% 
30.09.03 0.42% 523.50 -7.07% -7.49% 33.80 -3.70% -4.12% 
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DNB Monthly  
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31.10.03 0.42% 592.42 13.17% 12.75% 41.30 22.19% 21.77% 
28.11.03 0.42% 595.87 0.58% 0.16% 41.20 -0.24% -0.66% 
30.12.03 0.42% 625.94 5.05% 4.63% 44.40 7.77% 7.35% 
30.01.04 0.36% 670.15 7.06% 6.70% 42.10 -5.18% -5.54% 
27.02.04 0.36% 736.61 9.92% 9.55% 44.40 5.46% 5.10% 
31.03.04 0.36% 707.27 -3.98% -4.35% 45.00 1.35% 0.99% 
30.04.04 0.36% 671.17 -5.10% -5.47% 43.50 -3.33% -3.70% 
28.05.04 0.36% 677.12 0.89% 0.52% 42.60 -2.07% -2.43% 
30.06.04 0.36% 724.36 6.98% 6.61% 47.30 11.03% 10.67% 
30.07.04 0.36% 715.12 -1.28% -1.64% 48.00 1.48% 1.12% 
31.08.04 0.36% 719.54 0.62% 0.25% 52.50 9.38% 9.01% 
30.09.04 0.36% 774.67 7.66% 7.30% 53.25 1.43% 1.07% 
29.10.04 0.36% 752.62 -2.85% -3.21% 54.00 1.41% 1.05% 
30.11.04 0.36% 812.42 7.95% 7.58% 57.75 6.94% 6.58% 
30.12.04 0.36% 821.59 1.13% 0.76% 59.75 3.46% 3.10% 
31.01.05 0.31% 839.07 2.13% 1.82% 58.25 -2.51% -2.82% 
28.02.05 0.31% 902.47 7.56% 7.24% 63.25 8.58% 8.27% 
31.03.05 0.31% 887.65 -1.64% -1.95% 64.75 2.37% 2.06% 
29.04.05 0.31% 831.95 -6.27% -6.59% 60.00 -7.34% -7.65% 
31.05.05 0.31% 867.05 4.22% 3.91% 62.50 4.17% 3.86% 
30.06.05 0.31% 955.91 10.25% 9.94% 68.25 9.20% 8.89% 
29.07.05 0.31% 1005.04 5.14% 4.83% 68.00 -0.37% -0.68% 
31.08.05 0.31% 1064.08 5.87% 5.56% 67.25 -1.10% -1.41% 
30.09.05 0.31% 1101.58 3.52% 3.21% 67.50 0.37% 0.06% 
31.10.05 0.31% 1014.91 -7.87% -8.18% 66.50 -1.48% -1.79% 
30.11.05 0.31% 1054.00 3.85% 3.54% 70.75 6.39% 6.08% 
30.12.05 0.31% 1112.82 5.58% 5.27% 72.00 1.77% 1.46% 
31.01.06 0.34% 1194.53 7.34% 7.00% 74.50 3.47% 3.13% 
28.02.06 0.34% 1223.54 2.43% 2.09% 82.00 10.07% 9.73% 
31.03.06 0.34% 1314.46 7.43% 7.09% 88.25 7.62% 7.28% 
28.04.06 0.34% 338.62 -74.24% -74.58% 85.50 -3.12% -3.46% 
31.05.06 0.34% 317.67 -6.19% -6.53% 78.25 -8.48% -8.82% 
30.06.06 0.34% 315.65 -0.64% -0.98% 77.25 -1.28% -1.62% 
31.07.06 0.34% 321.95 2.00% 1.66% 78.00 0.97% 0.63% 
31.08.06 0.34% 321.63 -0.10% -0.44% 81.75 4.81% 4.47% 
29.09.06 0.34% 309.95 -3.63% -3.97% 79.90 -2.26% -2.60% 
31.10.06 0.34% 337.93 9.03% 8.69% 85.60 7.13% 6.79% 
30.11.06 0.34% 346.45 2.52% 2.18% 83.70 -2.22% -2.56% 
29.12.06 0.34% 371.37 7.19% 6.85% 88.50 5.73% 5.40% 
31.01.07 0.40% 387.11 4.24% 3.84% 93.70 5.88% 5.48% 
28.02.07 0.40% 369.56 -4.54% -4.93% 83.00 -11.42% -11.82% 
30.03.07 0.40% 386.16 4.49% 4.09% 85.80 3.37% 2.98% 
30.04.07 0.40% 398.97 3.32% 2.92% 85.50 -0.35% -0.75% 
31.05.07 0.40% 414.55 3.91% 3.51% 81.40 -4.80% -5.19% 
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29.06.07 0.40% 426.52 2.89% 2.49% 76.20 -6.39% -6.79% 
31.07.07 0.40% 418.43 -1.89% -2.29% 77.70 1.97% 1.57% 
31.08.07 0.40% 399.17 -4.60% -5.00% 79.90 2.83% 2.43% 
28.09.07 0.40% 423.13 6.00% 5.60% 82.70 3.50% 3.11% 
31.10.07 0.40% 438.04 3.52% 3.13% 88.50 7.01% 6.61% 
30.11.07 0.40% 422.60 -3.52% -3.92% 86.90 -1.81% -2.21% 
28.12.07 0.40% 422.08 -0.12% -0.52% 83.00 -4.49% -4.89% 
31.01.08 0.37% 335.47 -20.52% -20.89% 69.60 -16.14% -16.52% 
29.02.08 0.37% 367.78 9.63% 9.26% 77.00 10.63% 10.26% 
31.03.08 0.37% 356.72 -3.01% -3.38% 77.30 0.39% 0.02% 
30.04.08 0.37% 405.23 13.60% 13.23% 76.30 -1.29% -1.67% 
30.05.08 0.37% 437.62 7.99% 7.62% 73.40 -3.80% -4.17% 
30.06.08 0.37% 411.22 -6.03% -6.41% 64.80 -11.72% -12.09% 
31.07.08 0.37% 374.95 -8.82% -9.19% 66.30 2.31% 1.94% 
29.08.08 0.37% 377.41 0.66% 0.28% 63.10 -4.83% -5.20% 
30.09.08 0.37% 281.73 -25.35% -25.72% 44.40 -29.64% -30.01% 
31.10.08 0.37% 214.54 -23.85% -24.22% 38.50 -13.29% -13.66% 
28.11.08 0.37% 192.79 -10.14% -10.51% 26.30 -31.69% -32.06% 
30.12.08 0.37% 199.13 3.29% 2.92% 27.00 2.66% 2.29% 
30.01.09 0.33% 201.15 1.01% 0.68% 23.60 -12.59% -12.93% 
27.02.09 0.33% 191.57 -4.76% -5.09% 25.65 8.69% 8.35% 
31.03.09 0.33% 203.72 6.34% 6.01% 30.25 17.93% 17.60% 
30.04.09 0.33% 226.66 11.26% 10.93% 41.75 38.02% 37.68% 
29.05.09 0.33% 265.71 17.23% 16.89% 52.00 24.55% 24.22% 
30.06.09 0.33% 254.46 -4.23% -4.57% 49.00 -5.77% -6.10% 
31.07.09 0.33% 269.39 5.87% 5.53% 53.34 8.86% 8.52% 
31.08.09 0.33% 271.58 0.81% 0.48% 61.50 15.30% 14.96% 
30.09.09 0.33% 293.03 7.90% 7.57% 66.90 8.78% 8.45% 
30.10.09 0.33% 299.29 2.13% 1.80% 65.95 -1.42% -1.75% 
30.11.09 0.33% 317.56 6.10% 5.77% 63.80 -3.26% -3.59% 
30.12.09 0.33% 339.32 6.85% 6.52% 62.75 -1.65% -1.98% 
29.01.10 0.29% 329.81 -2.80% -3.10% 67.65 7.81% 7.52% 
26.02.10 0.29% 317.57 -3.71% -4.00% 64.20 -5.10% -5.39% 
31.03.10 0.29% 342.61 7.89% 7.59% 67.90 5.76% 5.47% 
30.04.10 0.29% 348.15 1.62% 1.32% 70.45 3.76% 3.46% 
31.05.10 0.29% 313.20 -10.04% -10.33% 64.50 -8.45% -8.74% 
30.06.10 0.29% 299.43 -4.40% -4.69% 63.15 -2.09% -2.39% 
30.07.10 0.29% 327.73 9.45% 9.16% 75.45 19.48% 19.18% 
31.08.10 0.29% 322.09 -1.72% -2.01% 69.65 -7.69% -7.98% 
30.09.10 0.29% 349.95 8.65% 8.36% 80.05 14.93% 14.64% 
29.10.10 0.29% 371.22 6.08% 5.78% 80.40 0.44% 0.14% 
30.11.10 0.29% 361.25 -2.69% -2.98% 76.00 -5.47% -5.77% 
30.12.10 0.29% 400.40 10.84% 10.54% 81.90 7.76% 7.47% 
31.01.11 0.26% 393.25 -1.79% -2.05% 79.50 -2.93% -3.19% 
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28.02.11 0.26% 408.31 3.83% 3.57% 86.60 8.93% 8.67% 
31.03.11 0.26% 408.49 0.04% -0.22% 84.85 -2.02% -2.28% 
29.04.11 0.26% 413.39 1.20% 0.94% 85.30 0.53% 0.27% 
31.05.11 0.26% 405.99 -1.79% -2.05% 81.15 -4.87% -5.13% 
30.06.11 0.26% 386.66 -4.76% -5.02% 75.20 -7.33% -7.59% 
29.07.11 0.26% 383.59 -0.79% -1.05% 78.60 4.52% 4.26% 
31.08.11 0.26% 349.68 -8.84% -9.10% 64.75 -17.62% -17.88% 
30.09.11 0.26% 322.92 -7.65% -7.91% 59.40 -8.26% -8.52% 
31.10.11 0.26% 356.93 10.53% 10.27% 64.95 9.34% 9.08% 
30.11.11 0.26% 354.02 -0.82% -1.08% 58.80 -9.47% -9.73% 
30.12.11 0.26% 357.60 1.01% 0.75% 58.55 -0.43% -0.69% 
31.01.12 0.18% 365.95 2.34% 2.16% 61.90 5.72% 5.55% 
29.02.12 0.18% 397.40 8.59% 8.42% 71.75 15.91% 15.74% 
30.03.12 0.18% 394.39 -0.76% -0.93% 73.20 2.02% 1.85% 
30.04.12 0.18% 389.21 -1.31% -1.49% 61.70 -15.71% -15.89% 
31.05.12 0.18% 353.19 -9.25% -9.43% 55.10 -10.70% -10.87% 
29.06.12 0.18% 375.55 6.33% 6.16% 58.95 6.99% 6.81% 
31.07.12 0.18% 392.54 4.52% 4.35% 63.50 7.72% 7.54% 
31.08.12 0.18% 404.35 3.01% 2.83% 66.60 4.88% 4.71% 
28.09.12 0.18% 415.42 2.74% 2.56% 70.25 5.48% 5.31% 
31.10.12 0.18% 410.64 -1.15% -1.33% 71.20 1.35% 1.18% 
30.11.12 0.18% 411.12 0.12% -0.06% 70.55 -0.91% -1.09% 
28.12.12 0.18% 410.30 -0.20% -0.37% 70.40 -0.21% -0.39% 
31.01.13 0.19% 429.85 4.76% 4.58% 76.40 8.52% 8.34% 
28.02.13 0.19% 435.58 1.33% 1.15% 85.50 11.91% 11.73% 
27.03.13 0.19% 434.21 -0.31% -0.50% 85.65 0.18% -0.01% 
30.04.13 0.19% 444.24 2.31% 2.12% 94.25 10.04% 9.86% 
31.05.13 0.19% 453.82 2.16% 1.97% 95.45 1.27% 1.09% 
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Table A.2: Annualised returns on 10-year Norwegian Government Bond Yield  
Year Annual Return 
1993 6.86% 
1994 7.46% 
1995 7.43% 
1996 6.78% 
1997 5.89% 
1998 5.40% 
1999 5.52% 
2000 6.22% 
2001 6.24% 
2002 6.38% 
2003 5.04% 
2004 4.36% 
2005 3.74% 
2006 4.07% 
2007 4.78% 
2008 4.47% 
2009 4.00% 
2010 3.52% 
2011 3.12% 
2012 2.10% 
2013 2.23% 
             Source: (Norges Bank, 2013) 
Table A.3: Comparison of returns of DNB Lang Obligasjon 20 with OBX 
Date OBX Value 
DNB Lang Obligasjon 20 
Values (NOK) 
Monthly Return  
(OBX) 
Monthly Return 
 (DNB Lang Obligasjon) 
30.06.08 411.22          9,509.34  - - 
31.07.08 374.95          9,649.61  -8.82% 1.48% 
29.08.08 377.41          9,769.47  0.66% 1.24% 
30.09.08 281.73          9,589.22  -25.35% -1.85% 
31.10.08 214.54        10,032.30  -23.85% 4.62% 
28.11.08 192.79        10,399.42  -10.14% 3.66% 
30.12.08 199.13        10,634.21  3.29% 2.26% 
30.01.09 201.15        10,510.46  1.01% -1.16% 
27.02.09 191.57        10,576.13  -4.76% 0.62% 
31.03.09 203.72        10,604.25  6.34% 0.27% 
30.04.09 226.66        10,568.27  11.26% -0.34% 
29.05.09 265.71        10,649.76  17.23% 0.77% 
30.06.09 254.46        10,756.94  -4.23% 1.01% 
31.07.09 269.39        10,746.23  5.87% -0.10% 
31.08.09 271.58        10,827.45  0.81% 0.76% 
30.09.09 293.03        10,945.26  7.90% 1.09% 
30.10.09 299.29        11,047.65  2.13% 0.94% 
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Date OBX Value 
DNB Lang Obligasjon 20 
Values (NOK) 
Monthly Return  
(OBX) 
Monthly Return 
 (DNB Lang Obligasjon) 
30.11.09 317.56        11,174.21  6.10% 1.15% 
30.12.09 339.32        11,101.27  6.85% -0.65% 
29.01.10 329.81        10,516.48  -2.80% -5.27% 
26.02.10 317.57        10,622.22  -3.71% 1.01% 
31.03.10 342.61        10,598.98  7.89% -0.22% 
30.04.10 348.15        10,680.59  1.62% 0.77% 
31.05.10 313.20        10,776.76  -10.04% 0.90% 
30.06.10 299.43        10,850.41  -4.40% 0.68% 
30.07.10 327.73        10,912.96  9.45% 0.58% 
31.08.10 322.09        11,121.99  -1.72% 1.92% 
30.09.10 349.95        11,045.45  8.65% -0.69% 
29.10.10 371.22        10,999.01  6.08% -0.42% 
30.11.10 361.25        11,074.55  -2.69% 0.69% 
30.12.10 400.40        10,971.11  10.84% -0.93% 
31.01.11 393.25        10,318.41  -1.79% -5.95% 
28.02.11 408.31        10,289.22  3.83% -0.28% 
31.03.11 408.49        10,297.07  0.04% 0.08% 
29.04.11 413.39        10,380.75  1.20% 0.81% 
31.05.11 405.99        10,511.84  -1.79% 1.26% 
30.06.11 386.66        10,552.89  -4.76% 0.39% 
29.07.11 383.59        10,698.47  -0.79% 1.38% 
31.08.11 349.68        10,767.15  -8.84% 0.64% 
30.09.11 322.92        10,880.28  -7.65% 1.05% 
31.10.11 356.93        10,836.81  10.53% -0.40% 
30.11.11 354.02        10,892.42  -0.82% 0.51% 
30.12.11 357.60        11,005.68  1.01% 1.04% 
31.01.12 365.95        10,536.82  2.34% -4.26% 
29.02.12 397.40        10,580.90  8.59% 0.42% 
30.03.12 394.39        10,649.60  -0.76% 0.65% 
30.04.12 389.21        10,658.95  -1.31% 0.09% 
31.05.12 353.19        10,813.09  -9.25% 1.45% 
29.06.12 375.55        10,827.56  6.33% 0.13% 
31.07.12 392.54        10,998.06  4.52% 1.57% 
31.08.12 404.35        11,106.90  3.01% 0.99% 
28.09.12 415.42        11,182.32  2.74% 0.68% 
31.10.12 410.64        11,244.97  -1.15% 0.56% 
30.11.12 411.12        11,325.22  0.12% 0.71% 
28.12.12 410.30        11,354.94  -0.20% 0.26% 
31.01.13 429.85        10,766.66  4.76% -5.18% 
28.02.13 435.58        10,882.45  1.33% 1.08% 
27.03.13 434.21        10,983.78  -0.31% 0.93% 
30.04.13 444.24        11,100.89  2.31% 1.07% 
31.05.13 453.82        11,095.17  2.16% -0.05% 
Source: (Bloomberg, 2013) 
